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WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ON
INTER-ATTORNEY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
IT is often advantageous for attorneys of persons with a community of in-
terest in litigation or in business transactions to exchange information. Such
interchange is frequently necessary, for example, to enable proper appraisal
of the conspiratorial acts often alleged in antitrust suits.1 Lawyers may hesi-
tate to pool information freely, however, fearing that it might cause loss of
immunity for material ordinarily privileged from either evidentiary use or pre-
trial discovery. 2 Such material falls into two classes: 1) a lawyer's "work
product," protected from pre-trial discovery unless "good cause" is demon-
strated;3 2) confidential communications from a client to his attorney, pro-
1. See, e.g., communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Mathias F. Correa, of
Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl, New York, dated April 20, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
Exchange of information is also often advantageous in mass tort actions, such as Penn. R.R.
v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953) (railroad explosion causing damage to ap-
proximately 9,000 persons). See communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Joseph
Keane, of Milton, McNulty & Augelli of Jersey City, N.J., dated April 14, 1954, in Yale
Law Library. And a "Working Committee" of 7 lawyers was formed to handle the trial
of 308 suits arising from the famous Texas City harbor explosions. See In re Texas City
Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1952), and communication to the YALE
LAW JOURNAL from Vernon Elledge, of Elledge, Urban, Elledge & Bruce of Houston,
Texas, dated April 26, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
2. It is apparent that fear of waiving these privileges may result in withholding in-
formation. See communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Roy W. McDonald, of
Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, New York, dated April 30, 1954, in Yale Law
Library. And the question of whether or not the interchange of data constitutes a waiver
often arises, particularly in antitrust litigation. See communications to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Roy W. McDonald, supra, and from Mathias F. Correa, of Cahill, Gordon,
Reindel & Ohl, New York, dated April 20, 1954, in Yale Law Library. A memorandum
dealing with this question was prepared by the cooperating attorneys in the recent case
of United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See communications to
the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Herman A. Heydt, Jr., of Breed, Abbott & Morgan, New
York, dated April 27, 1954, and from Walter K. Earle, of Shearman, Sterling & Wright,
New York, dated May 26, 1954, in Yale Law Library. However, the question was ap-
parently of minor importance in that case because there were few documents that might
have been privileged. See communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Edward R.
Wardwell, of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl, New York, dated April 7,
1954, and from Roy W. McDonald, supra, in Yale Law Library.
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), defines the "work product" of an
attorney as that which is reflected in "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible
ways." The Hickman case held that, even though this "work product" is not accorded the
absolute protection of the attorney-client privilege, its revelation cannot be secured by
deposition under FEn. R. Civ. P. 26 without showing "good cause." See note 4 infra.
This qualified privilege is also given an attorney's "work product" under FD. R. Civ. P.
34, which authorizes the pre-trial production of documents upon a demonstration of "good
cause."
A number of states have accepted the Hickman rule. See, e.g., Miami Transit Co. v.
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tected absolutely from both pre-trial discovery and the lawyer's testimonial
disclosure.4 If one party or his attorney reveals either type of data to another
party or his attorney, the privilege ordinarily accorded this material could be
held waived because of disclosure to a third personP An additional ground
for suspending the confidential communication privilege could be the absence
of the necessary attorney-client relation between the declarant and the other
party or his attorney." And even if the attorney-client privilege were held to
preclude forcing such other person or his attorney to reveal confidential com-
munications disclosed to him,7 it is uncertain whether the privilege would
apply if that person voluntarily testified against or sued the declarant 8
Hums, 46 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1950) ; State v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8, 12, 226 S.W.2d 711, 713
(1950) ; Schwartz v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 64 A.2d 477, 480-1 (N.J. Co.
Ct. 1949).
4. Complete immunity from pre-trial discovery of a client's confidential communi-
cations to his attorney is provided in the federal courts by the requirement of FI. R. Ciy.
P. 26 and 33 that information sought through deposition or interrogatory not be "privi-
leged." E.g., Rowe v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 1 Moo. F. R. Smv. 370 (D.D.C.
1939) ; Grauer v. Schenley Products Inc., 26 F. Supp. 76S (S.D.N.Y. 1933). See hMc'fr,
FmzAL PRAcrcE § 26.22, p. 1035 (2d ed. 1951).
For a complete survey of the development and application of the attorney-client privi-
lege as an absolute bar to testimonial disclosure, see S NVrmoF, Evns:cE §§ 22Q-2329
(3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIG.MOR).
5. Generally, if the client makes the statement either directly to a third person or to
his attorney in the presence of a third person, he is deemed to have waived the privile-ge
on the theory that he could not have intended his statement to be confidential. Eog.,
Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 Pac. 26 (1839) ; Crawford v. Raible, 206 Iowa 73M, 221
N.WV. 474 (1928); In re Quick's Estate, 161 Wash. 537, 297 Pac. 193 (1931). And if the
client is held to have impliedly authorized his attorney's disclosure of the information to
a third person, the privilege is also waived. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924
(9th Cir. 1949). Further, it appears that an attorney will generally be held to have au-
thority to disclose privileged data to an adverse party. Reg. v. Downer, 14 Cox Cr. Cas.
486, 489 (1880); Lloyd v. Mostyn, 2 Dowl.P.C.N.S. 476 (1842) somble; 3 lViGxom-
§ 2325. Thus, a court would probably hold that such disclosure to a cooperating party or
to his attorney was also authorized by the client.
6. Since the privilege is designed to protect only the relation between the client and
his own attorney, immunity is generally restricted to communications between such per-
sons. E.g., Watson v. Detroit Free Press, 24-8 Mich. 237, 226 NA. 854 (19-9) ; State v.
Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 498, 42 S.E.2d 636, 703 (1947).
7. Although the privilege generally immunizes only testimony by the client or the
attorney, see 8 WVIGMORE §2324, it also applies to testimony of a third person if he is
classified as an "agent" of either the client or the attorney while transmitting, receiving,
or overhearing the communication. E.g., Landsberger v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 450 (1855) (attur-
ney's clerk) ; In re Busse's Estate, 332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N.E.2d 36 (1947) (zervant of
client) ; Maas v. Bloch, 7 Ind. 202 (1855) (interpreter) ; Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821,
87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (client's insurance company). It is likely that a court
which holds that disclosure to another party or to his attorney does not constitute waiver
will also prohibit forcing testimonial disclosure by such a third person by categorizing
him as an "agent." For if the third person could be required to divulge the information,
it would be purposeless to hold that there had been no waiver.
S. Although the privilege belongs to the communicating client, see S WVioxorn § 2321,
he might be held to have assumed the risk of voluntary revelation by formerly cooperating
parties. See text at notes 40-3 infra.
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Despite a paucity of cases, it appears safe to conclude that the exchange of
"work product" among counsel for parties with a common interest will not
subject that data to pre-trial discovery. The decisions reasonably suggest that
a mere showing of such interchange does not establish the "good cause" neces-
sary to revoke the qualified privilege of this material.0 "Good cause" has
always consisted of a demonstrated hardship upon the party seeking dis-
covery.Y0 Thus, if a witness becomes unavailable, a party may secure his
recorded answers to the questioning of an adverse party's lawyer, even though
they may reveal the "mental processes" of the interrogating attorney."1 The
interchange of information among cooperating lawyers, however, by itself
imposes no hardship upon another person.12
The few cases relevant to the more complicated question of the attorney-
client privilege indicate that persons conducting a "joint defense" may pool
information without waiving this privilege.' 3 But these decisions leave un-
settled the meaning of "joint defense" as well as the rights of co-plaintiffs,
persons with more limited common interests in litigation, and co-adventurers
in business transactions.14 Only two American holdings are based on the
9. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Smith
v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See Byers Theatres, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D.
286, 289 (W.D. Va. 1940).
10. E.g., Dellameo v. Great Lakes S.S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 77 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (produc-
tion of hospital records denied because plaintiff could obtain them by exercising reasonable
diligence) ; Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 99 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (same). See,
generally, Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COL. L. Rtv.
1026 (1950) ; Note, 62 HARV. L. Rmv. 269 (1949).
11. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 51.1 (1947) ; Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow
Corp., 176 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. Hoffman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 7 F.R.D.
574, 575 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
12. The argument for waiver would probably be based upon the contention that the
information exchanged is inaccessible to the adverse party. Acceptance of this as demon-
strating "good cause," however, would completely eliminate the qualified privilege of
"work product," because the same argument can always be made. Hence something fur-
ther should be required before the privilege is denied.
13. Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Cahoon v. Common-
wealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871). See Smale v. United States, 3 F.2d 101, 102 (7th
Cir. 1924 (no "joint defense" between persons jointly indicted for conspiracy to influence
jurors because trial preparation was "separate and distinct") ; Leonia Amusement Co. v.
Loev's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (privilege may apply in cooperative
antitrust defense) ; Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 529-30, 230 S.W.2d 987, 990-1, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950) (no intent to conduct a "joint defense" between attorneys of
co-defendants) ; State v. Hodgdon, 89 Vt. 148, 149, 94 At. 301, 301-2 (1915) (no "com-
mon defense" among persons jointly indicted for murder) semble.
14. There is reason to believe that the counsel of persons engaged in a cooperative
business venture may not be able to exchange information without waiving the attorney-
client privilege. Harris v. Daugherty, 74 Tex. 1, 11 S.W. 921 (1889), held that the attor-
ney-client privilege did not protect statements made by a buyer during a purchase and
sale conference with the seller and his attorney. Under the broader English rule, see note
15 infra, the absence of one of the conferees' attorneys was deemed irrelevant in similar
circumstances. Rochefoucauld v. Boustead, 65 L.J. Ch. 794 (1896).
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"joint defense" rule, although it is supported by dicta in several cases.10
Cahoon v. Commonzwealth 10 involved a joint forgery indictment of A, B, and
C. Upon the separate trial of A, the court held that B's attorney could not
testify to admissions made by A during a joint consultation of the co-defen-
dants and their attorneys. And in Schmitt ,. Emery,17 a personal injury suit
against the drivers of two cars, the court refused to admit in evidence a de-
fendant's written statement which his attorney had given to the other defen-
dant's lawyer.18
Because of this lack of precedent, a court now has great latitude in inter-
preting the "joint defense" principle. Even if the rule were extended by
analogy to protect interchange of information among co-plaintiffs' attorneys,
it might still be cast in any of four progressively broader forms. Thus, the
privilege could be restricted to cases where the result of litigation affects all
defendants or plaintiffs identically, as in class actions.10 Or protection might
be extended whenever there is community of interest in at least one major
issue of a case, such as a plaintiff's contributory negligence. ° A third posi-
tion would enforce the privilege where there is any joint interest in litigation,
even if only in a minor issue such as the exclusion of evidence.2 The broadest
definition of the "joint defense" rule would protect all persons with a common
interest in joint consultation, even if no litigation was in prospect.-
One basis for predicting the future development of the "joint defense" doc-
trine is the weakness of its policy rationale. Some courts have erroneously
15. See note 13 szpra.
The only two relevant English cases project the privilege beyond the "joint defense"
theory. Entoven v. Cobb, 2 D.G.M. & G. 632, 42 Eng. Rep. 1019 (Ch. 152), involved
privileged data exchanged by attorneys of three holders of similar bonds. Although they
were not jointly suing their creditor, they had a common interest in proving the validity
of each other's bonds. Therefore the court held that the exchange of data among them
could not bring an inference of intent to waive the privilege. Rochefoucauld v. Boustead,
65 L.J. Ch. 794, (1896), extends the privilege to statements made durin- a conference
concerned with business and not litigation.
16. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) R22 (1871).
17. 211 -Minn. 547, 2 NV.2d 413 (1942).
18. Although the court stated that the defendants had "substantially the same caue,"
their community of interest was less than that of the defendants jointly indicted fur b~ur-
glary in the Cahoon case. In the Schmitt case, a judgment against one defndant .vtjuld
be completely unrelated to the issue of the other's liability. And active ceopcrati,n in this
case was apparently limited to the exchange of one statement during preparation of a
joint objection to the admission of evidence.
19. This category might also include criminal conspiracy cases, where it is quite
probable that a conviction of one of the conspirators will presage conviction of all. Class
actions would cover suits by or against corporate shareholders or steckhbiders in unin-
corporated associations. See 3 Moor, FErt, . Pzuc'rTcE § 23.08.
20. This class would probably include mass tort actions where all plaintiffs are joint-
ly interested in proving the defendant's negligence, but where each has his own damage
claim. See note 1 supra.
21. The Schmitt case would fall into this category. See note 18 supra.
22. This appears to be the English rule. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
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regarded this rule as simply a necessary extension of the ordinary attorney-
client privilege.23 A client's confidential communications to his attorney have
traditionally been immunized in order to secure more adequate legal repre-
sentation through inducing full disclosure.24 Since the privilege hampers the
search for truth and often shelters the guilty, it has been strictly construed. 26
Nevertheless, it is retained to encourage complete divulgence both by the per-
son whose cause is partially just and by the client who mistakenly regards
some of his actions as legally culpable. 20 However, a court could reasonably
conclude that the purpose of the privilege is adequately served once disclosure
is made by a client to his own attorney. Enthusiasm for the "fox hunt"
philosophy of litigation is waning,27 and the tactical advantage in an exchange
of information among independently hired attorneys might be deemed of in-
sufficient social importance to justify an extension of the privilege. The prob-
ability of judicial refusal to apply the privilege would vary inversely with the
importance of pooling information, which in turn would depend upon the de-
gree of community of interest among the parties.
These policy considerations are counterbalanced by the fact that restrictions
of the privilege in information pooling cases could be largely circumvented by
common hiring of attorneys. 28 There is generally no waiver of the attorney-
client privilege when information is exchanged among attorneys jointly repre-
senting several clients.29 And a lawyer probably qualifies as a joint attorney
23. See Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 554, 2 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1942); Cahoon
v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 838-9 (1871).
24. See, e.g., Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98, 103 (1833) ; Anderson v. Bank,
2 Ch. D. 644, 649 (1876); Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833) ;
Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 Atl. 975, 976 (1895) ; 8 WIGMoRE § 2291 ; 1 GnvN-
LEAF, EVIDENC E § 238 (1854). Wigmore suggests that the privilege also serves the func-
tion of preventing an attorney from feeling a "sense of treachery," but grants that this
factor is "somewhat speculative." See 8 WIGMORE § 2291, p. 557. This cannot be a judi-
cially accepted reason for retaining the privilege, however, because it would apply with
equal force to confidential communications made to anyone.
25. See, -e.g., In re Ruos, 159 Fed. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1908) (privilege restricted to infor-
mation obtained directly from client) ; State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76, 25 N.W. 936 (1885)
(privilege inapplicable to testimony of third person who overheard communication to
attorney) ; State v. Falsetta, 43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906) (same).
26. See 8 WIGmOpE § 2291, pp. 555-7.
27. The outstanding indication of this trend is the enactment and the increasingly
liberal interpretation of the pre-trial discovery sections of the Federal Rules. See, e.g.,
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1.947); Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997
(2d Cir. 1942) ("But the reformers are surely right that 'unfairness' to a diligent lawyer
is of no importance as against much-needed improvement in judicial ascertainment of the
'facts' of cases; the public interest in such ascertainment is paramount." Frank, J.). See,
generally, Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COL. L. Riv.
1026 (1950); Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. OF Cm. L. Rnv. 297
(1940).
28. The Cahoon decision was greatly influenced by the fact that the clients could
have jointly hired the attorneys and thus escaped the possibility of waiver. See Cahoon
v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841-2 (1871).
29. E.g., Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 N.W. 158 (1903) ; State v. Archuleta, 29
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if he is paid by the several parties.20 This arrangement is often utilized when
the interests of plaintiffs or defendants coalesce perfectly or when a court
directs consolidation of suits because of "a common question of law or fact."'3
Where the concord of interests is less than complete, however, or where con-
solidation is impossible either because of state law or because the cases are
being tried in different states,32 attorneys apparently prefer to represent their
clients independently, confining their cooperation to the exchange of infor-
mation.33 But if such inter-communication were held to destroy the attorney-
client privilege, lawyers could arrange to be hired jointly by all clients with
common interests. The unwary attorney, however, might not think of this
strategy. The law should not make waiver depend upon the adroitness of
counsel.
Courts should compromise these conflicting interests by permitting pool-
ing of information without waiver of the attorney-client privilege if the data
exchanged are relevant to a common interest among the clients. This would
limit the broadest application of the "joint defense" rule only by the require-
ment of relevancy.34 Since the joint attorney escape device can be used under
N.M. 25, 217 Pac. 619 (1923). The only limitation upon use of this escape device is the
rule that the privilege is inapplicable in a subsequent suit between the joint consultants.
Griffin v. Griffin, 125 IlL 430, 17 N.E. 782 (18') ; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 151 Neb. 113, 35
N.W.2d 637 (1949); Billias v. Panageotou, 193 Wash. 523, 76 P.2d 937 (1938). Contra:
Hull v. Lyon, 27 Mo. 570 (1853). Where the interests of the parties are substantially
identical, this rule would probably not hinder utilization of the joint attorney scheme.
30. Apparently the determining factor is a manifested intent to consult the attorney
as a common agent. Thus a lawyer may be a common attorney even though not paid by
both parties. See Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942); Jahnhe v.
State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 NAV. 158 (1903). And joint payment probably sufficiently mani-
fests the requisite intent. See Cahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841-2
(1871).
31. FE. R. Cn. P. 42(a). A court has discretion to order consolidation under this
rule. The joint attorney device was used after consolidation of the claims arising out of
the Texas City Harbor explosions. See note I szpra.
32. Actions pending before different courts cannot be comnolidated under FED. L Civ.
P. 42(a). United States to use of N.Y. Plumbers Specialties Co. v. Silverburgh Con-
struction Co., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); Schwartz v. Kaufman, 46 F. Supp.
318 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). And many states do not have the consolidation provisions of the
Federal Rules. For a general discussion of limitations upon consolidation, see 5 Mooar,
FEDERAL PsAcTIcE § 42.02.
33. Some lawyers consider use of the joint attorney device highly desirable. See
communications to the YALE LAw Joun,%. from Vernon Elledge, of Elledge, Urban, Ell-
edge & Bruce, Houston, dated April 26, 1954, and from Ray G. Brown, attorney in Port-
land, Ore., dated April 2, 1954, in Yale Law Library. Others appear to view its practi-
cality as severely limited by factors such as friendship and traditional representation. See
communications to the YALE L.w Joy,_RAL from Roy AV. McDonald, of Donovan, Leisure,
Newton & Irvine, New York, dated April 30, 1954; from W. Graham Claytor, Jr., of
Covington & Burling, Vashington, dated April 5, 1954; and from A. C. Allen, of Allen
& Roberts, Portland, Ore., dated April 2, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
34. No definite relevancy rule applies to the attorney-client privilege. Many cuurts
hold that the client must believe that the communication relates to a matter upun whkh
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any circumstances, the privilege should not be confined to those situations
where the clients have a complete or substantial identity of interest. Still,
policy considerations dictate greater restriction of the privilege in information
pooling cases than in joint attorney situations. When several persons hire the
same lawyer, all confidential communications to him must be privileged to in-
sure expert scrutiny of all the facts. However, when several parties with
common interests independently hire attorneys, disclosure to an expert is
sufficiently guaranteed by protecting all confidential communications between
each client and his own attorney. The more limited end of promoting effec-
tive cooperation among the lawyers can be served adequately by shielding
interchange of only relevant material.3 5
The suggested rule might be conveniently cast in any of three doctrinal
molds. The various clients and their attorneys could simply be excluded from
the class of "third persons" whose presence judicially robs a communication
of its confidentiality. 6 Or courts might regard each lawyer as representing
all clients in the area of their common interest. Relevant communications could
then be protected by direct analogy to the joint attorney rule. And this might
be modified by considering each lawyer an agent of his own client as well as
an attorney of all other clients. Communications between lawyers would then
be between a client's agent and one of his attorneys; and such confidential
communications are privileged.3 7
The proposed extension of the privilege would have an uncertain effect
upon a client to whom the confidential communications of other clients are
revealed at a joint conference. 38 While he probably could not be compelled
legal advice may be or is being sought. See, e.g., State v. Mewherter, 46 IowA 88, 94
(1877) ; Denunzio's Receiver v. Scholtz, 117 Ky. 182, 192, 77 S.W. 715, 716 (1903). But
the relation may be quite tenuous. See, e.g., Aiken v. Kilburne, 27 Me. 252, 262 (1847);
National Bank v. Delano, 177 Mass. 362, 365, 58 N.E. 1079, 1080 (1901). This liberal
view is necessary to insure full disclosure to the attorney. See 8 WIGMoRE § 2310. How-
ever, since the social value gained by interchange of information among attorneys is sub-
stantially counterbalanced by the social interest in attaining truth, see text at notes 23-7
supra, and since the imparter of the data will generally be a trained lawyer, it would be
reasonable to impose a strict relevancy requirement on such exchanges. Where the client
gives the information to a cooperating party's attorney, it would be possible to establish
a presumption of relevancy.
35. The generality of this criterion should not bar its application. The question of
relevancy is frequently decided during trials. An analogous use of the relevancy rule
occurs in determining whether or not communications by a client's agent are within the
scope of his agency. See Le Long v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N.Y. Supp. 150
(1.921).
36. This rationale is used both where "agents" of the lawyer or client were present
when the communication was made and where another party who has jointly hired the
attorney was present. See cases cited notes 7 and 29 supra.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. Presumably the privilege would apply to a cooperating client whether he simply
overhears the communications being made to one of the attorneys or whether the dis-
closure is made directly to him. Although the attorney-client privilege is generally re-
stricted to statements made to an attorney, see note 6 supra, the classification of a person
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to disclose the confidential information, he might be permitted to divulge it
if he voluntarily testified against or sued the maker of the communication. A
similar situation arises when persons who jointly employed an attorney are
opposing parties in a later lawsuit. The attorney-client privilege then does
not apply either to the jointly hired attorney or to his former clientsP0 This
principle rests on the rationale that neither client would have intended to keep
his communications to the lawyer confidential vzis d zis the other.40 Identical
reasoning in the pooling of information cases would conclude that, in a suit
between formerly cooperating persons, the attorney-client privilege should not
bar either the parties or the formally collaborating lav.yers from testifying to
exchanged confidential communications. And, by analogy, a person who
voluntarily testifies against one of his former conferees should not be bound
by the privilege.41 While dictum in the Schmnitt case opposes this result,42
the Cahoon holding supports it.43 There the court allowed a defendant who
had turned state's evidence to testify to an admission made by his co-defendant
during a joint consultation among them and their attorneys.
The application of the proposed rule to lawyers is clear except where one
of the previously cooperating parties is permitted to testify to another's con-
fidential communication. Under any other circumstances none of the attorneys
could testify to relevant confidential communications made to him or over-
heard by him at a joint conference. 44 And the Cahoon case held that even
as an "agent" extends the protection to communications made to such a person. See note
7 supra. By analogy, categorization of a cooperating party as a non-disqualifying third
person should immunize statements made directly to him at least to the extent that he
could not be forced to disclose them.
39. See note 29 supra.
40. See cases cited note 29 upra. Thus, the formal rationale for this rule is one of
intent. If actual intent were to govern, however, waiver would not generally result, since
it is likely that clients in such situations never intend that the information should be used
against them in litigation. The controlling reason for the rule is probably the judicial
belief that full disclosure to a common attorney may be suiciently promoted withut
applying the privilege in a later suit by the jointly consulting parties. In most cases, the
expectations of the communicator probably do not include the contingency of suit by the
other party.
41. There is support for applying the privilege in joint attorney cases to voluntary
testimony by one of the formerly cooperating parties in a later criminal action, as dis-
tinguished from a later civil action where the witness is a party. State v. Archuleta, 29
N.M. 25, 217 Pac. 619 (1923). Contra: Jahnke v. State, 63 Neb. 154, 94 N.A. 153 (193).
There appear to be no rational grounds for this distinction. The communicating part3's
intention to waive confidentiality in relation to the other party is the same whether the
party testifies in a criminal or a civil action. And his reasonable expectations no more
include the other person's bringing suit against him than that person's turning state's
evidence.
42. Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 554, 2 N.AX.2d 413, 417 (1942).
43. Cahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 823 (1871).
44. This would simply be the purpose and effect of holding that neither the attorneys
nor their clients are third persons whose presence would destruy the privilege. See note
38 supra.
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when a person turning state's evidence is allowed to testify to admissions
made by his co-defendant in a joint conference, the attorney-client privilege
blocks refutation by the witness' former attorney unless it is waived by all
former conferees, including the witness himself.45 Since the privilege should
protect only the person making the confidential communication, 40 his waiver
alone should enable an attorney to reveal such information. 47
Protecting the exchange of relevant information among parties with a com-
mon interest in the absence of declarant's voluntary waiver would neither un-
duly hamper the search for truth nor cause inequity to the client.
45. Cahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
46. See 8 WiGmom § 2321 and cases cited therein.
47. The only justification for not permitting such testimony by the attorney would be
that the communication reflected in some way another confidential communication by a
cooperating party.
